Report: Issues remaining over controversial power-sharing deal

The main development this week was the signing of the power-sharing deal between the military and the civilian opposition. This report will look at the outstanding issues surrounding the deal, and the suggested solutions for a peaceful, democratic Sudan. But first, the latest developments from both the military and the protest movement…

Himedti and DFC representative signing the deal.

The military

Multiple sources (July 12) claimed that it military thwarted a coup attempt which was an effort to undermine the power-sharing deal.

For the first time in Sudan In The News’ existence, an article that portrayed Omar Al Bashir and the military council somewhat positively was published. AFP (July 13) reported on desert nomads oblivious to Sudan’s uprising, with one saying “I want Bashir, our father, to be back” and crediting Himedti for protecting camel traders from thieves in the desert.

Nonetheless, reports of the military council’s complicity in the June 3 massacre continued. The Guardian (July 12) reported on BBC Africa Eye’s documentary Sudan’s Livestream Massacre, which featured a testimony from a soldier who said that Himedti ordered the massacre on May 20.

With the internet returning to Sudan, AFP (July 15) shocked Sudanese responses to footage of the massacre, which going viral. A student said the aim of the internet blackout was to hide information and evidence of the atrocities, although some activists believe that Himedti’s RSF helped the videos go viral in a bid to intimidate protesters.

The protest movement

The psychological impact of the massacre on Sudanese protesters continues to hold sway over the country’s future. On the 40th day anniversary of the massacre, tens of thousands of Sudanese took to the streets in “Justice First” marches organised by the Sudanese Professionals Association, chanting “blood for blood, even if we get civilian rule” (multiple sources, July 13). The Sudanese Professionals Association also rejects absolute immunity against prosecution for those responsible for the violence against protesters (Reuters, July 16).

Then, multiple sources (July 18) reported that Sudanese protesters converged on the newly-named ‘Freedom Square’, rolling out banners to honour those martyred by the fatal protest dispersals.

1. Issues with the deal:

Multiple sources (July 17) reported that the military and civilian opposition finally signed the power-sharing deal, although the opposition later sought to postpone the signing of the contentious “Constitutional Declaration,” amid dissent with the broad Declaration of Freedom and Change ranks (Multiple sources, July 19).

While we looked at what the deal entails in details in last week’s report, this week we will focus on the remaining outstanding issues that make the deal so controversial.

I. Constitutional agreement - how will power be divided?

Multiple sources (July 17) reported that the military and opposition were scheduled to discuss a constitutional agreement that will specify the division of powers on July 19. The issue is the division of powers between the sovereign council (to be the most powerful body in Sudan), cabinet (that will manage Sudan’s day-to-day affairs) and legislative body.

The problem is that while it was agreed that the civilians will nominate all Cabinet members except for defence and interior technocrats, the military council, which is to lead the sovereign council for the first 21 months, wants to hold the power of a veto over appointments.

Moreover, the military also backtracked on an agreement for civilians to appoint two-thirds of the legislative body.

The Communist Party said that it, alongside other Declaration of Freedom and Change factions, had already rejected the deal because it fails to immediately handover power to civilians or facilitate an international investigation into the June 3 massacre.

Multiple sources (July 19) then reported that the Sudanese opposition postponed talks on the constitutional agreement, with protest leaders saying that three rebels groups that are part of the Declaration of Freedom and Change coalition expressing reservations over the deal.

Indeed, the broad nature of the DFC coalition and the lack of a shared ideological foundation leaves it prone to exploitation by the military in the negotiations.

II. Military exploiting DFC divisions

Richmond Danson (Washington Post, July 13) argues that the military may exploit DFC divisions during their 21-month leadership of the sovereign council by drafting laws that protect themselves, setting legal precedents for the civilian government to follow and delaying the establishment of a legislative council that would prevent rules favouring military candidates for power.

As a result, Ryan Brenner (Washington Post, July 14) argues that the power-sharing agreement is ““straight out of [Al Bashir’s] playbook,” simply temporarily appeasing the international community until the regime “endlessly” extends its power.

Horn of Africa analyst Rashid Abdi echoes similar sentiments (Financial Times, July 17), stating that: “21 months is a long time…there is a lot of fear that military will use this period to eviscerate the opposition and further consolidate power.”

III. No justice

Activist Khalda Yacoub told the Guardian (July 17) that the deal would not stop “the killing of people in [Sudan]…the members of the [ruling military council] are part of the former regime,” in statements the reflect general apathy of the deal’s inability to bring justice.

The Atlantic Council’s Cameron Hudson (July 17) suggested that “justice will be delayed, if not denied” if the investigation into the June 3 massacre is “Sudanese-owned,” leaving “military leaders with blood on their hands…in a position to maintain power.”

IV. The flawed document

Hudson pointed out flaws in the document itself, criticising the “Functions for the Transitional Period” list for:

Its stated attempt to establish peace across Sudan despite rebel groups rejecting it.
The absence of concrete mechanisms to promote the role of women and youth in society, arguing that its promises to do so merely appease the driving forces of the protests.
The military council scapegoating the Bashir regime which it “faithfully served”
The military’s promise to manage its own reforms.
The lack of clarity on how the Sovereign Council will function.

V. Instability: the militia problem:

Sudan’s security situation challenges the power-sharing agreement’s ability to bring peace and democracy, due to worries that armed groups may violently reject their exclusion from power. However, Mohammed Eisa, a Darfuri, told the Guardian (July 17) he accepts the deal due to radical change being “impossible” amid the amount of weapons across the “very fragile” Sudan.

Nonetheless, Alyateb Mustafa, a head of a coalition of Islamist parties, warned the Wall Street Journal (July 17) that some of his groups have affiliated militias who may commit violence if that is the case.

Moreover, the Himedti problem remains. Analysts Alan Boswell and Harry Verhoeven both told Bloomberg (July 18) that any move to check Himedti’s power risks splitting the military council and triggering a civil war. However, in the same article, Salah Aldoma, a professor of international relations at Omdurman Islamic University, said: “Himedti is looking for some guarantees so he can make a safe exit,” as “his use was only as a military assistant to oust Bashir.

2. Sudanese Solutions

I. Keep protesting - To prevent the military from exploiting the DFC’s divisions and dominating the power-sharing deal, Richmond Danson calls for Sudanese protesters to continue mobilizing and protesting (Washington Post, July 13). Such a measure would also pressure the DFC coalition to not make concessions that would be unacceptable to protesters.

II. Independent judiciary – Danson also cited the establishment of an independent judiciary and the implementation of transitional justice as key indicators of whether the agreement will succeed.

3. International Solutions

Alan Boswell, of the International Crisis Group, told Bloomberg (July 17) that coordinated pressure across continents” is required to keep Sudan’s power-sharing deal on track, in calls that fit into a wider theme of requests for the international community to help deliver a solution for Sudan.

I. Send Al Bashir to ICC - With regards to the absence of justice and accountability in the deal, Ryan Brenner (Washington Post, July 14) calls for the international community to pressure the military council to demonstrate their commitment to democracy by sending Omar Al Bashir to face trial at the ICC for genocide in Darfur, arguing that peace in Sudan is not possible with justice and accountability.

II. Keep the Saudis, Emiratis and Egyptians at bay – Ahmed Aboudouh (Independent, July 19) argues that the West will need to monitor Sudan’s power-sharing deal as the Saudi-UAE-Egypt axis attempts to scupper hopes of democratic transition in Sudan. Aboudouh cites the Egyptian view of the deal as a failure because it gives leverage to their rival Ethiopia, and UAE and Saudi keennes to groom Himedti into Sudanese leadership in pursuit of their own political and economic interests.

III. Greater influence for African blocs – If the strategy of keeping the UAE-Saudi-Egyptian axis is to be followed, it must involve empowering African Union (AU) and the East African regional bloc the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), at their expense

Michael Woldemariam and Alden Young (Foreign Affairs, July 19) argue that Sudan is in the midst of competing regional visions between the aforementioned Arab states and African blocs. They argue that the Saudi-Emirati support of Sudan’s military council fits into their wide Horn of Africa strategy of forestalling democratic transitions in the entire Horn of Africa to empower autocratic dictators who will pursue their regional security interests.

However, the AU and IGAD are said to be supportive of Sudan’s democracy movement, and if their influence in Sudan exceeds that of the Saudis and Emiratis, they will lay the groundwork for a regional order “that can deliver peace, development, and accountable government.”