Diplomatic Briefing: Can Sudan do more to get removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
Can Sudan do more to get removed from the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
This diplomatic briefing will cover the pragmatic measures Sudan has taken in February 2020 to get removed for the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list. After exploring the impact of Sudan’s terrorist designation on economic and democratic development, the briefing will conclude with policy suggestions that have been forward to advance US-Sudan interests.
Introduction
Sudanese foreign policy interests continue to be dominated by attempts to seek removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism (SST). According to former US State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin, the SST designation is a “diplomatic nuclear bomb,” given that the “politics of getting off the list are always incredibly complicated and draw in issues that don’t directly have anything to do with terrorism.” (13 February, AP).
Nonetheless, the Sudanese government is taking drastic measures in its aims of removal from the SST list, reflecting the pragmatism with which the matter is being approached. Despite denying involvement in al-Qaeda terrorist attacks committed in the 1990s, Sudan has agreed to pay compensation to victims. In addition, the normalisation of ties with Israel is set to continue, despite moves to do so being met with opposition from key political stakeholders.
1. What has Sudan done to get removed from the SST list?
I. Sudan pays damages for al-Qaeda terrorist attacks
In a bid to get itself removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism (SST), Sudan has agreed to pay a $30 million settlement to the families of 17 US Navy sailors killed in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. Yet, Sudan's government "explicitly denies" its involvement in the attack and says the pay-out is intended to "settle the historical allegations of terrorism left by [Omar al-Bashir’s] regime." (13 February, Multiple Sources).
As noted by John Hursh, the Editor-in-Chief of International Law Studies at the US Naval War College, while successive Sudanese governments have denied responsibility for the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, the current government has agreed to pay compensation “only to satisfy the U.S. condition for its removal from the SST list.” (21 February, Just Security).
However, the pay-out has paved the way for more compensation pay-outs related to al-Qaeda terrorist attacks to be made by the Sudanese government. The US President Donald Trump administration is reportedly poised to argue before the Supreme Court that Sudan should pay $4.3 billion in punitive damages following the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people. (24 February, Multiple Sources).
Sudan’s willingness to continue taking drastic measures in its attempts to satisfy conditions for its removal from the US SST list would be exhibited if damages are paid for more al-Qaeda attacks.
II. Sudan seeks normalisation with Israel
Sudanese normalisation with Israel continues to attract controversy. Sara Abdelgalil of the Sudanese Professionals Association, maintained the position that normalisation with Israel should be left to an elected government. In addition, Abdelgalil said that Israeli ties are antithetical to the Sudanese revolution given that “some people view the political regime in Israel as a terrorist regime.” (21 February, Deutsche Welle)
However, the chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, Abdelfattah El-Burhan, said that only “ideologist political groups” opposed normalisation with Israel. El-Burhan added that Israel is “playing a key role” in Sudan’s removal from the SST list (16 February, Radio Dabanga). Indeed, Jonas Horner, backed up El-Burhan’s claim, stating that: “overt Israeli endorsement of a lift for Sudan will provide a key push to the US government” to remove Sudan from the SST list (29 February, Bloomberg).
Nonetheless, question marks hang over how urgent the US President Donald Trump administration views Sudan’s removal from the SST list. In addition, the economic consequences of Sudan’s SST designation have also been questioned.
2. How does Sudan’s SST status impact economic and democratic development?
David Pilling argues that Sudan’s absence of an “obvious champion in Washington” under the US presidency of Donald Trump poses an obstacle to Sudan’s democratic transition (12 February, Financial Times). John Hursh also argued that the US President Trump administration’s lack of urgency in removing Sudan from the SST list threatens to stall Sudanese progress towards peace and democracy, citing its hindrance of sanctions relief and investment. (21 February, Just Security).
However, Lauren Blanchard, an Africa analyst for the US Congress, noted that while the SST designation is a reputational risk for investors, “concerns about corruption, outdated infrastructure and economic fragility may still deter investment for some time.” (29 February, Bloomberg). Blanchard’s comments highlight priority areas for the Sudanese government focus on, in order to attract investment and provide an economic lifeline for the democratic transition.
3. Solutions
I. What can Sudan do?
If removal from the US SST list continues to be Sudan’s foreign policy priority, security sector reforms will be necessary. Sudan’s Minister of Information, Faisal Mohammed Salih, told AP (13 February) that the “US believe Sudan’s support for terror was carried out through its security apparatus…So they want to be assured that there has been a radical change in the way it operates.”
Nonetheless, alternative solutions provided for the Sudanese government to improve relations with US (and western) policymakers revolve around building confidence and improving Sudan’s image among the aforementioned parties.
Pilling suggests that a successful Sudanese democratic transition requires Sudan shifting its perception among “a whole generation of western officials” away from associations with “genocide and terrorism.” (12 February, Financial Times)
In addition, David L. Phillips, a Director of the Program on Peacebuilding and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights calls for the Sudanese government to adopt confidence-building measures to act as benchmarks for the process of Sudan’s removal from the SST list (19 February, Sudan Tribune)
Economic benchmarks suggested by Phillips are: the enforcement of money-laundering restrictions and banking reforms, and established control over the gold sector “that has been a major source of corruption.” Security benchmarks suggested by Phillips are: that peace talks with armed rebel groups conclude with security sector reforms and the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of non-state militias.
Even so, Sudan could still benefit from international, particularly US, support in implementing economic and security sector reforms that would satisfy conditions for Sudan’s re-integration into the international community, and serve an economic lifeline for the democratic transition.
II. What can the world do for Sudan?
Jihad Mashamoun, a doctoral candidate at the University of Exeter, identified three immediate measures that align US and Sudanese interests. (10 February, Africa Report)
Firstly, Mashamoun called for the US to appoint an ambassador to Sudan that “clearly” communicates US expectations to Sudanese political stakeholders, in order to help the transitional government, manage popular expectations.
Secondly, Mashamoun suggests that the US can help solve Sudan’s security dilemmas by working to handover members of al-Bashir’s regime to Sudanese prosecutors. Finally, Mashamoun calls for the international community to help Sudan retrieve the billions that al-Bashir’s regime stashed outside Sudan, rather than following the unpopular “narrow economic agenda” of the World Bank and IMF.
Indeed, Pilling warned that the absence of external financial support for Sudan’s democratic transition may lead Sudan to the path of Egypt or Myanmar, where revolutions that ousted one military regime saw it replaced by another. (12 February, Financial Times)