Security Briefing: State of Emergency in Port Sudan

Overview

With a state of emergency declared in Port Sudan, the security situation on Sudan’s eastern coast presents an opportunity for Himedti and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to increase their domestic and international power.

This briefing is also available as a Twitter thread, with videos included.

Domestic legitimacy

In a video we posted on Twitter, a Bani Amer tribal leader issues a call to join Himedti’s Rapid Support Forces. In Port Sudan, the Bani Amer and Nuba tribes are gripped in a deadly conflict.

As Jerome Tubiana warned back on July 9 (Foreign Policy), Himedti is poised to build up a support base in Sudan’s peripheries, to compensate for his lack of support in Khartoum. Analysts fear that Himedti will exploit perceptions in the western periphery (such as Darfur) and the east (such as Port Sudan) that Sudan’s democratic movement is an Arab-elite movement with a narrow set of interests, only catering to urban Sudanese in Nile Riverain cities of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdorman.

However, experts on Sudanese politics and security such Suliman Baldo of the Enough Project and academic Alex de Waal told the Associated Press (August 6) that Himedti’s history of atrocities mean he has too many enemies to build up support in Sudan’s peripheral regions.

Nonetheless, Himedti and the RSF can still de-legitimise the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition, particularly following the FFC’s public disputes with Sudanese rebels. The rebels accuse the FFC of being disinterested in securing peace for Sudanese conflict zones outside Khartoum.

Noting that the urban Sudanese who dominate the FFC prioritise civic rights, whereas peripheral Sudanese prioritise peace and safety, former UK ambassador to Sudan Dame Rosalind Marsden called for the FFC to compromise with the rebels. (Chatham House, August 9).

.Therefore, we can view the state of emergency in Port Sudan, and the Bani Amer tribal leaders allegiance to Himedti, as an expansion and legitimisation of the RSF. The RSF has a chance to add to its influence in West and Central Sudan by gaining a foothold in the East, under the auspices of “restoring order”.

Following the June 3 massacre which it is blamed for, the RSF can now brand itself as a peacemaker.

International legitimacy

It must also be noted that Port Sudan is a highly strategic location. Although Himedti lacks support in the capital city, he acquired wealth via control of gold mines in West Sudan.

Gaining influence in the Port Sudan provides easy access to the Red Sea, a major shipping route. More importantly, the oil refinery in Port Sudan handles oil transported from South Sudan, which upon independence in 2011, took away 75%(!) of Sudan’s proven oil reserves.

The RSF can also use its dominance in Port Sudan as leverage for international legitimacy. Russia and China have business interests there, while Qatar-Turkey compete with Saudi-UAE for influence in the Red Sea.

Like East African leaders before him - from Ethiopia’s Mengistu during the Cold War, to Omar Al Bashir until very recently - Himedti could play-off the Red Sea strategic interests of regional and global powers against each-other - to secure a better deal for himself.