#SudanUprising Briefing: Slow progress on security sector reforms and human rights, as the RSF complains of marginalisation

With a security sector reforms being a key demand of the Sudanese revolution, recent developments indicate setbacks and complications, after Sudanese security forces fired tear gas at protesters who demonstrated against the dismissal of soldiers who joined the uprising against Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, who continue to emphasise their democratic credentials, complain about their marginalisation by the civilian-led government. Nonetheless, concerns about the impact of the RSF’s financial and military power on the democratic transition remain, with the Sudanese government called upon to accelerate reforms that would regulate the RSF financially and hold them accountable for allegations of responsibility for the June 3 massacre.

1. Protests

At least 17 were wounded in clashes between Sudanese security forces and protesters who demanded the reinstatement of army officers who were dismissed for refusing to crack down on demonstrations against former president Omar al-Bashir (20 February, Multiple Sources).

The protests rose out of public anger following reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has retired 79 military officers from the medium and junior ranks, among them a sub-lieutenant called Mohamed Siddiq Ibrahim Ahmed, who was the first military officer to join protesters outside the army headquarters during the first week of April 2019, before Omar al-Bashir’s ouster. (18 February, Sudan Tribune).

In response, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) called for the minister of the interior and the police general director to be sacked and replace them with “national elements who belong to the revolution.” The SPA also called for soldiers and military officers who had been “arbitrarily excluded from military service” to be reinstated, and for those who “protected and sided with the people’s revolution to be celebrated, promoted and given a leadership position.” (20 February, Multiple Sources).

2. Is the RSF a partner in the revolution?

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander, and deputy chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, Himedti, complained of marginalisation by the civilian government. Therefore, Himedti has called for “code of conduct in which [the sovereign council, cabinet, FFC, the youth and all supporters of change] pledge - to work for the interest of [Sudan].” (16 February, Sudan Tribune).

Denying efforts to obstruct the civilian-led government, Himedti said that he can leverage his relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to help solve Sudan’s economic crisis, but complained that the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) are not allowing him to do so. (16 February, Sudan Tribune)

The RSF continues to emphasise its democratic credentials. An RSF “human rights consultant” who “illustrates the RSF’s hints of reform and change,” told the Guardian (February 9) that the security sector has a key role to play in Sudan’s democratic transition. The consultant added that the RSF are champions of minority rights and that Himedti is a “challenge against political elites.”

However, the Guardian note that the RSF’s military and financial power pose a threat to a peaceful democratic transition in Sudan. The RSF dominates Sudan’s lucrative gold industry via Al Gunade company, which has been exempt from attempts by Sudanese authorities to dissolve mining companies linked to Omar al-Bashir’s regime.

Moreover, Sudan lacks safeguards to prevent Al-Gunade and the RSF operating illegally, with the gold industry lacking transparency and Sudanese authorities unable to regulate supply chains plagued” by smuggling and controlled by militias.

Nonetheless, in a positive sign for the RSF’s reputation, Human Rights Watch (20 February) declined naming Himedti or the RSF in calls for a committee investigating the June 3 2019 Khartoum massacre to meet international standards. Human Rights Watch (HRW) called for the committee to possess the necessary protection to “investigate those responsible higher up the chain of command… as a member of the Sovereign Council may be implicated.” (HRW, 20 February).

It is worth noting that in HRW’s earlier calls for an independent inquiry into the June 3 massacre (published on July 9 2019), it was stated that: “In June alone, government forces including the RSF killed over 130 protesters,” and “opened fire on protesters and burned down their sit-in camp” on June 3.

3. Human Rights

HRW (20 February) has also noted that the Sudanese government is yet to implement the reforms envisaged in the constitutional charter, including the formation of legislative council and establishment of rights-focused commissions.

Therefore, HRW call for Sudan’s transitional government to accelerate legal and security sector institutional reforms and progress on domestic justice initiatives, in comprehensive justice system reforms to ensure the protection of rights, ensure adequate public participation, and address gender discrimination.