Sudan Security Report | January 2020

Security Incidents in Sudan during January 2020 saw an intensification of Sudan’s two main security threats – instability within the security apparatus, and ethnic/tribal violence in peripheral regions.

A mutiny on January 14 has shone a spotlight on the inherent fragility of Sudan’s military alliances, and the obstacles this presents for security reforms.

The Sudanese security apparatus continues to show signs that it is unable to maintain security across Sudan, following a series of violent incidents across Sudan. Most notably, a massacre in Abyei, the disputed oil-rich area on Sudan’s border with South Sudan, has seen the Sudanese army and militias affiliated to Omar al-Bashir accused of responsibility.

To solve the instability within the security apparatus, solutions have focused on addressing the fragile power-balances within it. To prevent friction between militias and the armed forces, commentators have called for the civilian government to take leadership of security sector reforms. In addition, it has been suggested that a unified leadership would prevent conflict being triggered by disenfranchised Islamist groups.

To resolve the conflicts in the marginalised peripheries, the prospect of devolution has been raised, as well as a peace settlement which also takes into account the drastic change of demographic patterns in West Sudan.

A mutiny in Khartoum

Multiple sources (January 14) reported that former employees of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) launched a mutiny in Khartoum, as well as shutting down to oilfields in Darfur, in protest about their severance packages. The deputy chairman of Sudan’s sovereign council, Himedti, said that former NISS chief Salah Gosh was behind the unrest. However, Gosh told Foreign Policy (January 17) that Himedti is “playing political games.”

For the background story on the NISS revolt, more context on the Himedti-Gosh rivalry, and the implications of the failed mutiny for Sudanese democratic development, please watch our Sudan Security Report on YouTube, where we highlight arguments that well-armed yet disenfranchised sections of Omar al-Bashir’s regime will continue to pose a security threat to Sudan, and the democratic transition.

Indeed, Jean-Baptiste Gallopin’s analysis of the NISS mutiny suggested that the mutiny indicates the fragility of Sudanese military alliances, with the mishandling of NISS severance packages “inspiring little confidence that [Sudanese] authorities have the means and expertise to prevent other, potentially more serious, rebellions.” (19 January, Washington Post).

To intensify matters, Hamid Suleiman, the undersecretary for the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining, confirmed that elements of Omar al-Bashir’s regime planned to sabotage oil fields in East Darfur and West Kordofan “by causing a rift between the local tribes.” (26 January, Sudan Tribune).

Violence across Sudan

Further signs that the Sudanese security apparatus is unable to maintain security are reflected in incidents across Sudan. In Bout, Blue Nile state, Sudanese Human Rights and Democracy Organisation (HUDO) claimed that the police failed to act after three churches were targeting by arsonists, twice in the space of three weeks. (20 January, Radio Dabanga). HUDO called upon the Sudanese government “to take urgent action to safeguard the constitutional rights of the affected citizens.”

In East Sudan, the The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in El Gezira held the police responsible for the shooting of two demonstrators who protested against a march of Islamists in Wad Madani, El Gezira. (13 January, Radio Dabanga). In Kassala, widespread protests were sparked after the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) shot and killed a civilian who was falsely suspected to be a smuggler. (21 January, Radio Dabanga).

In West Sudan, leaders in displaced camps in El Geneina, continue to demand that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia leave the city, located in Darfur, saying that they cannot return to the city following the massacre at the end of 2019. (22 January, Radio Dabanga). Indeed, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) said that clashes in West Darfur forced over 11,000 to flee into Chad following El-Geneina massacre. (28 January, AP). UNHCR spokesman Babar Baloch added that the violence in El-Geneina may have displaced 46,000 in Sudan alone, with Chadian villages on the Sudanese border already hosting 128,000 Sudanese refugees.

Meanwhile, in Abyei, the disputed oil-rich region on Sudan’s border with South Sudan, saw the Sudanese security apparatus directly blamed for massacre inspired by tribal differences.

Abyei incident

Three were killed in clashes between Dinka Ngok and Misseriya (Arab) tribesmen in Kolom in north-west Abyei on 20 January. Misseriya allegedly retaliated on January 22, by killing 32, wounding 24, abducting 15 children and burning 22 houses. The allegations were made by Dinka Ngok leaders. (24 January, Sudan Tribune).

However, Akon Akol, governor of Abyei told Radio Dabanga (22 January) that the assailants are “affiliated to the Sudanese Armed Forces.” These allegations were re-iterated by the head of the Abyei Administration from the South Sudanese side, Kuol Alor, who accused the Sudanese army and Misseriya militiamen, supported by the Popular Defence Forces, a militia linked to Omar al-Bashir. (24 January, Sudan Tribune).

Nonetheless, the Sudanese sovereign council blamed the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNIFSA) for the failure to protect civilians in Abyei. (24 January, Sudan Tribune). Sovereign Council spokesman Mohamed al-Faki said the protection of civilians in Abyei is full responsibility of UNIFSA, “given that the region is disputed and under the umbrella of the UN.”

Solutions

Civilian leadership of security sector reforms

Gallopin raised the prospect of security sector reforms triggering in-fighting between Himedti’s RSF and the SAF. To prevent such outcomes, he suggested that security sector reforms should be overseen by civilians, although this would be unlikely “without an initiative from Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.” (19 January, Washington Post).

However, Foreign Policy (January 17) note Hamdok’s precarious position, whereby he “has gone out of his way not to directly antagonise Himedti,” despite “quietly” outmaneuvering him by liberalising the gold sector to choke off RSF gold mining revenues.

Unified leadership:

According to UK-based academics Andrew Edward Tchie and Jihad Salih Mashamoun, security sector reforms would necessitate a unified leadership, so as to prevent the mobilization of disenfranchised Islamist conservatives and isolated security personnel. Therefore, Tchie and Mashamoun call for the Sudanese government to “deal carefully” with the “fractured” military, security and intelligence apparatus. (23 January, Africa Report).

Supporting poor Arab tribes that have displaced indigenous Darfuri tribes

To solve the continued ethnic violence in Darfur, Sudan expert Alex de Waal suggested that part of the solution will be the acceptance that Darfur’s “settlement patterns and demographics have changed for good,” citing “dramatic and accelerated urbanization.”

Therefore, to enable a peace settlement, Tufts University’s Helen Young calls for ways to also support poor Arab tribes that have displaced indigenous Darfuri tribes, so to prevent conflict being re-fueled. (8 January, New Humanitarian).

Addressing structural marginalisation

To prevent violence from flaring up in Sudan’s peripheral regions, Tchie and Mashamoun call for a vision of governance that addresses structural marginalization. Tchie and Mashamoun suggested the “real change” can be created and embedded through “innovative, sustainable, inclusive and law-abiding” policies such as devolution of powers.