Security Briefing: 4 key obstacles in Sudan's peace negotiations (January 2020)

Introduction:

This briefing explores four key obstacles preventing conflict resolution in Sudan at the start of 2020.

1. The Sudanese security apparatus has been blamed for deteriorating security situations in peripheral regions in south, west and east Sudan*.

Further obstacles are posed by a lack of progression in the peace negotiations:

2. Sudan Revolutionary Front has been unable to resolve its differences with the Forces for Freedom and Change.

3. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (faction led by Abdelaziz El-Hilu) continues to threaten to fight for self-determination in its territories unless the transitional government adopts secularism.

4. Divergence over the matter of secularism reflects the wider, historic obstacle to Sudanese conflict resolution – the issue of national identity.

Among the solutions presented include:

  • Transforming rebel groups into a civilian political parties.

  • Security sector reforms in which rebel groups would be integrated into a unified national army.

  • International intervention to bolster Sudanese security in the regional peripheries, amid suspicions that the security apparatus is fuelling conflict.

  1. Worsening security situations across Sudanese peripheral regions.

While El-Geneina massacre grabbed headlines, violence has erupted across Sudan towards the end of 2019, for which the transitional government has been blamed.

*As we have dedicated an individual briefing to el-Geneina massacre (which you can read about here) – it will not be covered in this briefing.  

Southern Sudan: In Abyei, an area disputed between Sudan and South Sudan, the Sudanese government was blamed after more than a dozen people were killed by militiamen aiming to displace indigenous people. (Radio Dabanga, 25 December)

Eastern Sudan: In El-Gedarif, near the Sudan-Ethiopia border, three Sudanese people were killed and four were wounded by Ethiopian gunmen. El-Gedarif locals blamed both the Sudanese government and Ethiopian army for the recurring attacks on Sudanese citizens by Ethiopian militants, which have included kidnappings, and the robbery of livestock. (Radio Dabanga, January 3).

Eastern Sudan: In Port Sudan, continued clashes between the Bani Amer and displaced Nuba tribes saw nine killed and 100 wounded (AP, January 4). The transitional government has also been blamed, with SPLM-N el-Hilu spokesman Omar Shurkian citing the firearms carried by Bani Amer tribesmen as indications that “they must have been receiving support from somebody somewhere.” (Sudan Tribune, January 7).

In a previous briefing - State of Emergency in Port Sudan - we linked to a video in which a Bani Amer tribal leader gave an oath of allegiance called for his fellow tribesmen to swear allegiance to the Rapid Support Forces.

West Sudan: The RSF were blamed for the El-Geneina massacre in West Darfur. In North Darfur, dozens were forced to flee their homes after gunmen attacked their villages (Radio Dabanga, January 5). In Nyala, South Darfur, UNAMID (29 December) called for the government to take action after its former headquarters – hosting assets worth approximately $100 million - were looted by “individuals in uniform.”

2. Continued friction between rebel groups and the civilians in the transitional government

The Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) announced its rejection of the participation of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in the Juba peace negotiations, citing “relations [that are] marred by chaos.” (Sudan Tribune, December 12).

The issue stems from the FFC’s rejection of SRF demands that a peace agreement precedes the formation of the transitional government.

According to SRF Chairman El Hadi Idris, the four disputed issues between the SRF and FFC are as follows: (Radio Dabanga, 15 December)

  1. The SRF demands that the appointment of state governors is delayed until a peace agreement is reached, with SRF suspicions that the FFC is seeking to allocate state governor positions to its members and supporters.

  2. The postponement of the formation of a Legislative council.

  3. The suspension of the appointment of civil service employees

  4. And finally, the amendment of the Constitutional Document to ensure that any peace agreements prevail over the charter. 

Another key issue that is impeding the peace negotiations is that while the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) demand the inclusion of national constitutional issues in the peace agenda, the transitional government insists on restricting negotiations to areas that the SPLM-N controls in South Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile states. (Radio Dabanga, 18 December).

A reflection of this divergence are demands by a faction of the SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz El-Hilu, who control the most territory out of Sudan’s rebel groups, threatening to fight for self-determination in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan unless the transitional government commits to nationwide secularism.

3. SPLM-N El-Hilu and the demand for secularism

Despite SPLM-N El-Hilu’s demands for self-determination unless secularism is adopted, the transitional government takes a pragmatic stance, rooted in fears of future friction with Islamist groups. The transitional government seeks to stage a constitutional conference that gathers all the political forces to decide on the separation between politics and religion (Multiple sources, December 17), but El-Hilu dismissed the conference as merely representative of [Arab] elites (28 December, Radio Dabanga).

The El-Hilu faction believes that a secular state would end the marginalisation of non-Muslims in Sudan. (Sudan Tribune, December 23). El-Hilu attributed the stalled peace talks to the government’s ambiguity on the secularism question, and re-iterated his view that secularism would preserve Sudan’s unity. (Sudan Tribune, January 3).

El-Hilu is not isolated in his preference for a secular Sudan. Siddig Youssef, a prominent Communist in the FFC, said that El-Hilu’s demands are in line with the Constitutional Document.  (Sudan Tribune, December 23). El-Hilu has also claimed that the UAE “showed understanding” regarding his factions demands for a secular state. (Sudan Tribune, 1 January).

Although the UAE has not released a statement, there are reasonable grounds to assume UAE for support for El-Hilu. Given the UAE’s influential role in the Middle-East’s anti-Islamist axis, its reported role in overthrowing al-Bashir, and its influence over Sudan’s security apparatus, an El-Hilu-UAE alliance would add authority, credibility and perhaps financial backing, to El-Hilu demands.  

4. National Identity

The issue of Sudanese national identity continues to pose an obstacle to Sudan’s chances of resolving conflict.

Speaking at the University of Khartoum, El-Hilu argued that national identity is the primary cause of Sudanese conflicts. (28 December, Radio Dabanga). El-Hilu said that Sudanese elites have not learned from past mistakes of insisting on coercive unity by “imposing” Arab-Islamic identity, adding that the Darfur war is due to western Sudanese having different identity to central government in Khartoum.

Solutions

For rebel groups

Sudanese political expert Dr Elwathig Kameir, argues that a peace agreement is contingent upon rebel groups transforming into civilian political organisations prepared for participation in the general elections (Radio Dabanga, 18 December).

Security sector reforms  - a united national army

Both Elwathig Kameir, and Yasir Arman, the deputy head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction under the leadership of Malik Agar (SPLM-N Agar), suggest that the road to conflict resolution can be paved by the integration of rebel groups into a united single army.

Arman attributed Sudanese insecurity to the existence of five armies within Sudan – calling for the merger of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces and armed rebel groups into a single professional national army, with a new military doctrine that prioritises the protection of the state, democratic promotion and economic stability. (Radio Dabanga, 6 January).

Security sector reforms  - Appointing democrats to security positions

Meanwhile, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) has called for structural changes in the administrative structures of the police and security services. Stating that the insecurity Sudan is witnessing are “well organised acts rather than coincidences,” the SPA has called for the chiefs of police, heads of departments, and public administrations to be replaced “with those who believe in change and freedom”. (Radio Dabanga, 5 January)

International intervention

Clinton Yak, the head of the Abyei civil society, urged the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to implement its mandate to protect civilians in the region.  Yak also called for the international community to supervise a new referendum on the disputed territory of Abyei, noting the conflict of interests between the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments. (Radio Dabanga, 25 December)

Demilitarisation

Yak also called on the Sudanese transitional government remove all militias and demilitarise Abyei.

Echoing similar sentiments, SPLM-N El-Hilu called for the transitional government to take “drastic measures” in combatting recurrent tribal violence in Port Sudan, having implied that the Bani Amer tribe is being armed. (Sudan Tribune, January 7)